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COMMENTARY
The Federal Securities Code in Flux: Limited
Offerings and Tender Offers
ROBERT T. LANG* and GERALD S. BACKMAN**
In light of increased criticism of the proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code, the authors, as securities practitioners, adopt a favora-
ble outlook towards the codification effort. While acknowledging
that further changes may be necessary in the bid to get congres-
sional approval, it is submitted that the Code has succeeded in
its attempt to bring order to the confusing mass of existing statu-
tory and administrative law. To illustrate their conclusion, the
authors offer an extensive analysis of the limited offering and
tender offer sections of the Code with several salient insights
into their advantages over existing law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The panel discussion held at the University of Miami School of
Law to discuss the ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code' focused
primarily on one overriding issue: whether Congress should adopt
the Code in its present form. While extolling the virtues of the
overall effort and the painstaking dedication of the Reporter, Profes-
sor Louis Loss, most of the participants criticized the draftsmen for
failing to reexamine policy questions such as the basic disclosure
philosophy of the securities laws, or for failing to conduct empirical
studies to determine whether these laws have served any useful
purpose.2 In fact, the tenor of the panel discussion was that the
Code, contrary to Professor Loss' statement of its objectives,' did
make major decisions of an essentially political nature and did en-
deavor to make substantive changes in areas that are not necessarily
"lawyer's law."
What the critics failed to recognize is that those who are most
directly affected by the federal securities laws,' namely the publicly
held and privately owned companies that come into contact with
these laws on a daily basis, are constantly faced with the problem
of good faith compliance with the current laws. This problem is
readily apparent to the members of the securities bar who not only
have the obligation of advising their clients but who have also been
frequently placed in the unenviable position of answering to the
public at large.5 From the standpoint of day to day compliance, it
1. ALI FEDERAL SEcuRrrTES CODE (Mar. 1978 Proposed Official Draft) [hereinafter cited
as FED. SEC. CODE].
2. See Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. Mimi L. REv. 1471 (1979); KRIPKE, Securities Law
Reform and the ALI Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MAMI L. REy. 1453 (1979); West, The
Federal Securities Code; Some Comments on Process and Outcome, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1485; WOLFSON, Comments on the Proposed Federal Securities Code: Transformation of the
Securities Act of 1933, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1495 (1979).
3. "In general ... the Code is not presuming to make major decisions of an essentially
political nature. That is to say, the substantive changes are fundamentally in the area of what
might be called 'lawyers' law." Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code - Its Pur-
pose, Plan and Progress, 30 VAND. L. REV. 315, 324 (1977).
4. Particular reference is made to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act], and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act].
5. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
In a recent case, two partners of a New York law firm were temporarily suspended from
practice before the SEC because they allegedly participated in violations of the 1934 Act and
failed to carry out their professional responsibilities to their corporate cl--. The Administra-
tive Law Judge focused on the adequacy of disclosure-and the counsel's - . in insuring
it-with respect to the company's financial condition during the period immediately preced-
ing its bankruptcy. In re Carter, SEC Ad. Proc. No. 3-5464, [1979] 494 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) A-13, F-1.
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is submitted that it is more important to develop a clear and under-
standable body of law than to attempt to resolve each and every one
of the political considerations affecting the wide range of subjects
covered, as long as the major substantive changes effected in the
process of codification do not do violence to the existing structure.
In this we believe the Code has succeeded.
From the vantage point of the securities law practitioner, the
establishment of objective standards for "limited offerings" (thirty-
five non-institutional purchasers)' and "tender offers" (thirty-five
offerees)7 is a worthwhile effort whether or not one agrees with the
"magic number" selected by the draftsmen. Similarly, at the very
least the codification of the antifraud rules' enables the practitioner
to focus his attention on a relatively limited series of statutory pro-
visions. Although commentators may validly raise policy questions
with respect to the conclusions reached by the draftsmen and as to
whether there has been unwarranted "reform," Congress will not be
precluded from considering these questions in the context of the
codification effort as a whole.
On the other hand, one cannot overlook the practical realities
of a proposed codification of the federal securities laws. As Professor
Loss stated at the commencement of the lectures, the drafters of the
Code were not interested in spending a decade drafting "what we
thought was a perfect Code that would have very little chance of
adoption . . . . Codification is a compromise. There has been a
great deal of it, and I am sure there will be more before the Code
becomes law."9
One of the major problems impacting upon the development of
the Code has been the dramatic changes that have been made in the
legislative, administrative and judicial developments of the federal
securities laws during the course of the codification effort. As one
commentator has noted, "[t]he draftsman of the Code had a par-
ticularly challenging and frustrating assignment, since he was
charged with capturing a moving target."'' In addition, each Tenta-
tive Draft of the Code has been subjected to intensive analysis,
criticism and debate to which the drafters had to be particularly
sensitive, since many of the commentaries were presented by attor-
neys whose major concerns were directed toward the practical appli-
6. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b).
7. Id. § 299.68.
8. Id. part XVI.
9. Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1431 (1979).
10. Bialkin, The Issuer Registration and Distribution Provisions of the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 327, 329 (1977).
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cation of the Code as a regulatory structure." The limited offering
exception to the definition of distribution'2 is illustrative of one of
the major areas of interest to which the Code has been particularly
responsive, not only in relation to developments in the law but also
in relation to the constructive criticism advanced by the commenta-
tors. Although numerous practical and theoretical problems still
remain, the treatment of limited offerings in the Code represents a
major advance in the development of a comprehensive body of law
and one that may not require significant change in order to be
adopted by Congress.
In contrast to the limited offering provisions, the law of tender
offers has been in such a constant state of flux that it has virtually
outpaced the Code draftsmen. 3 In the last decade, the tender offer
has become a preferred method of acquiring control of publicly held
companies and is thus an area of major interest." Not only have a
large number of states adopted legislation covering the subject," but
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently pro-
posed comprehensive new rules in an effort to codify existing law."'
This illustrates some of the obstacles facing the draftsmen in their
push for congressional approval. Indeed, unless Congress were to
conclude that the Code should be adopted in its present form for the
sake of codification and continuity alone, without making any sig-
nificant changes, it appears that even more compromise will be
required in the tender offer field before congressional adoption is
forthcoming.
II. THE LIMITED OFFERING
The "limited offering" is the Code's answer to the confusion
which has surrounded the nonpublic or private offering exemption
11. See generally Symposium: The American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1977).
12. A distribution is defined as "an offering other than (1) a limited offering or (2) an
offering by means of one or more trading transactions." FED. SEC. CODE § 242(a).
13. A. A. Sommer, Jr. has suggested that the SEC's proposed rules in this area can only
be described as a "tender offer code." Sommer, Tender Offer Rules Seek to Codify Permissi-
ble Conduct, NAT'L L.J. Mar. 19, 1979, at 24, col. 2.
14. See generally Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 176-84.
15. It appears that 31 to 37 states have adopted tender offer statutes, depending on which
commentator one reads. See e.g., Gould & Jacobs, The Practical Effects of State Tender Offer
Legislation, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 399, 402 (1978) (31 state statutes); FED. SEC. CODE § 607,
Note 1 ("30-odd" state statutes).
16. SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,935
(Feb. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as the Proposed Rules].
[Vol. 33:15511554
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of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act'7 and rule 146, 1 the latter representing
the SEC's attempt to provide "objective standards upon which re-
sponsible businessmen may rely in raising capital under claim of the
Section 4(2) exemption " But as Professor Loss stated:
We used to think we knew what "public offering" meant in the
early days of the Commission. If you did not sell to more than
twenty-five people or so, it was private. It was fairly simple.,"
But then the courts delved into the problem and began to talk
like law school professors. They discussed the purpose of the
statute-having financial sophistication and having the ability
to "fend for yourself" 2-to the point where nobody knows what
a public offering is anymore. The Commission adopted a four or
five page rule, which I should think would be just a bit harder
to comply with than registering."
Because of the need to redefine the private placement exemp-
tion in unambiguous terms, the Code-again to use Professor Loss'
term-has started from "scratch" by providing for a "limited offer-
ing" that would be exempt from the required filings if initial buyers
are comprised of institutional investors 3 and no more than thirty-
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1976).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (i978).
19. Id. at Preliminary Note 3.
20. This rule of thumb was never given official status as a rule but was espoused by the
Commission's first general counsel, John J. Burns. SEC Release No. 33-285, 1 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 2740-44 (Jan. 24, 1935).
21. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the only Supreme Court decision
which has ruled on § 4(2), the Court rejected a numerical criteria and stated that the applica-
bility of § 4(2) should turn on "whether the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is
a transaction 'not involving any public offering'." Id. at 125.
22. Loss, supra note 9, at 1438 (footnotes supplied). Professor Loss is not the only com-
mentator to express dismay at the perils of complying with rule 146. See Casey, SEC Rules
144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 571 (1977); Kinderman, The Private Offering
Exemption: An Examination of its Availability Under the Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAW 921
(1975); Rosenfield, Rule 146 Leaves Private Offering Waters Still Muddied, 2 SEc. REG. L.J.
195, 212-13 (1974); Kripke, SEC Rule 146: A 'Major Blunder, 172 N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1974, at
1, col. 3. Even a member of the SEC staff admits that "[rlule 146 is not entirely without
thorns and soft, subjective conditions." Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147; The
Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 622, 643 (1974).
See also Arthur, Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933: A Significant Codification,
56 Cm. B. REc. 94 (1974); Green & Wittner, Private Placements of Securities Under Rule 146,
21 PRACTICAL LAw. 9 (1975); Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption-Historical
Perspective and Analysis, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1974); Note, SEC Rule 146-The Private
Placement Exemption, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1125 (1974).
For opinions on the earlier proposed version of the rule, see Cassidy & Berkowitz,
Proposed Rule 146, 6 REv. SEc. REG. 949 (1973).
23. An institutional investor is defined as
(a) a bank, insurance company, or registered investment company, a fund, trust,
155519791
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five additional persons, or the seller so reasonably believes."4 Resales
during the first three years must not result in more than thirty-five
owners (apart from institutional investors and persons who become
owners otherwise than by purchase), unless any such excess results
from resales pursuant to an offering statement or an exemption."'
This limitation would be reduced to one year if the company has
been filing regular reports with the SEC for one year (the "one-year
registrant").5
Rule 146 was expressly made nonexclusive. In the Adopting
Release27 and in the preliminary notes to rule 146,s the SEC pointed
out that all the conditions of the rule must be satisfied in order for
the exemption to be available. Thus some practitioners, concerned
with inadvertently failing to meet its multiple demands, have struc-
tured offerings to satisfy the requirements judicially engrafted upon
the section 4(2) exemption.9 Many commentators, however, believe
that even if the statutory law has survived the accession of rule
146,10 "the task of persuading a court of law that an offering has met
the requirements of the varient interpretations under section 4(2) is
or other account with respect to which a bank or insurance company has invest-
ment discretion, or a person who controls any such person, except to the extent
that the Commission provides otherwise by rule with respect to any such class of
persons on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, and the
amount of assets under investment management, or (b) any other person of a class
that the Commission designates by rule on the basis of such factors.
FED. SEC. CODE § 275.
24. Id. § 242(b)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 242(b)(1)(B).
26. Id. § 242(b)(2)(A).
Under the Code, the present registration scheme is eliminated. Instead, a company will
register as such when it has $1,000,000 in assets and 500 holders of all securities. Id. § 402.
Such a company is referred to as a "registrant."
A "one-year registrant means a registrant that has been continuously a registrant for one
year." Id. § 299.16.
27. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, (1973-74] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2710, at
2909 (Apr. 23, 1974).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978).
29. Because of the difficulty and impracticality of applying rule 146 in many situations,
many issuers continue to rely upon the residual law surrounding the statutory exemption. See
Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar Association, Section 4(2) and
Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485 (1975); Committee on Developments in Business Financing,
American Bar Association, Institutional Private Placements Under the Section 4(2) Exemp-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933, id. at 515. Generally, in these authors' views, the character-
istics of a valid private offering are: (a) offeree qualification, which may be based upon
sophistication, wealth, or personal relationship, (b) access to or actual receipt of information
which may be less extensive than a registration statement (access resulting from economic
bargaining power is included); (c) a limited manner of offering; and (d) the absence of
redistribution. But see note 31, infra.
30. If experience under rule 144 is a guide, there is a strong possibility that the objective
1556 [Vol. 33:1551
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far too complex and uncertain an undertaking to be seriously con-
sidered by many businesses."'"
Rule 146 has been broadly criticized for its lack of a substantial
compliance standard, for the burden it imposes by requiring compli-
cated and detailed paperwork, for the limitations imposed on dispo-
sition, for its failure to distinguish between the widely different
types of transactions subsumed under the "nonpublic" offering, and
for the economic burdens of the disclosure requirements of the rule
which fall most heavily on small issuers.32
Rule 146 provides that offers and sales of securities by an issuer
shall be deemed not to involve a public offering within the meaning
of section 4(2) if all the conditions of the rule are met.33 Those
criteria of rule 146 will be read into judicial and staff interpretations of § 4(2). Connolly,
Private Offering Exemption, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 919 (1975).
In Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 612 (5th Cir. 1975), rule 146 was referred to
as a "useful frame of reference to an appellate court in assessing the validity of § 4(2)
exemptions claimed." See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 906 (5th Cir.
1977).
31. Casey, supra note 22, at 591. Lower court decisions since Ralston Purina have ex-
panded and refined the Supreme Court's standard for determining whether an offering was
"public" or "private."
In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967), the
Fourth Circuit stated that investors' financial sophistication was not sufficient to secure a
"private offering" exemption in the absence of an additional showing that the offerees had
access to certain information about the issuer. The Tenth Circuit, in Lively v. Hirshfeld, 440
F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971), combined the sophistication and access principles and held that
the only people who could be eligible for a legitimate private offering were those "persons of
exceptional business experience, and [in] 'a position where they have regular access to all
the information and records which would show the potential for the corporation.'" Id. at 633.
In Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court held that the issuer must also show that the investors in fact received the information
and that information available in a registration statement may not be sufficient. Id. at 690.
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), and the brief filed by the
SEC staff which the court adopted, led to total confusion in this area. The SEC brief reiter-
ated virtually every restriction mentioned by the courts over the years. SEC Staff Brief,
reprinted in part in [1971] 127 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-17. The Fifth Circuit held that
"the record does not establish that each offeree had a relationship with Continental giving
access to the kind of information that registration would have disclosed." 463 F.2d at 158.
32. See note 22 supra. In apparent recognition of both the uncertainty surrounding rule
146 and the need to assist small business capital formation, the SEC has proposed a small
issue exemptive rule. Proposed rule 242 would enable certain corporate issuers to sell up to
$2 million per issue of their securities during any six-month period without registration to an
unlimited number of "accredited persons," which would include institutions and persons
buying at least $100,000 worth of securities, and up to 35 other "nonaccredited" persons.
If the sales are made only to accredited persons, the rule would not require that pur-
chasers be furnished with specific information. If sales are made to both accredited and non-
accredited persons, however, the issuer would be required to furnish all purchases with the
same type of information specified in Part I of Form S-18, to the extent such information is
material to the understanding of the issuer, its business, and the securities being offered.
[1979] 519 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (1978).
1979]
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conditions focus on the manner of the offering," the nature of the
offerees, 35 the access to or furnishing of information to the offerees, :
the number of purchasers, 37 and the limitations imposed on disposi-
tion .38
A. Manner of Offering
Paragraph (c) of rule 146 prohibits any form of general solicita-
tion or advertising in connection with a private placement. The
forbidden devices include articles, notices or other communications
published in any newspaper, magazine or similar medium or broad-
cast over television or radio. Seminars and meetings are also pro-
scribed unless those attending the meeting are limited to qualified
offerees 5 and their representatives. Letters or circulars are prohib-
ited unless sent only to qualified offerees. Since an appeal to an
undifferentiated public is obviously antithetical to a private offer-
ing, there has been no serious objection to these restrictions, except
as they relate to other problems with the rule as a whole.
As every condition of the rule must be met, if one person who
did not qualify as a permissible offeree attended a meeting or re-
ceived a circular, the exemption might be destroyed, thus entitling
every other offeree, even if qualified, to rescind the transaction.' A
further complication is the incorporation of the extremely vague
"sophistication" test for defining a qualified offeree.4'
The Code also prohibits general advertising.2 The significant
34. Id. § 230.146(c).
35. Id. § 230.146(d).
36. Id. § 230.146(e).
37. Id. § 230.146(g).
38. Id. § 230.146(h).
39. For a discussion of paragraph (d) of the rule, describing who may qualify as an
offeree, see notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
40. Since rule 146 is not the exclusive means of complying with § 4(2) of the 1933 Act,
and since attempted compliance does not act as an election, a court might find that § 4(2)
has been satisfied by substantial compliance with the requirements of the rule. Connolly,
supra note 30, at 919.
The burden placed upon an issuer by the absence of a substantial compliance standard
is exemplified by Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972). In that
case, a wealthy and experienced venture capitalist, who was fully informed, was allowed to
walk out of his commitment by rescinding the deal merely because the defendants could not
sustain the burden of proving that the other offerees had been similarly informed. The court
apparently required more than substantial compliance with the terms of rule 146, even for
an exemption claimed under § 4(2), prior to the adoption of the rule. This case is an example
of the use of the rule's standards by the courts under the statutory exemption. See note 30
supra.
41. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra.
42. FED. SEC. CODE § 503(b).
[Vol. 33:1551
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difference between the Code and rule 146, however, is that the ban
on advertising in the Code is not a condition of the limited offering
exemption. A violation of the Commission's rules will not destroy
the limited offering exemption under the Code. The rationale be-
hind the change was that the concept of "general advertising" is
"inevitably vague" and therefore should not be a basis for imposing
absolute civil liability on the seller in an action for rescission or
damages."
B. Nature of Offerees
Under paragraph (d) of the rule, the qualifications of an offeree
are examined twice to assess the degree of his "sophistication."
Immediately prior to the offer, the issuer must have reasonable
grounds to believe, and must in fact believe, either that the offeree
is "capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment" because of his "knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters" or that the offeree can "bear the economic
risk of the investment."" Prior to any sale, the issuer must again
make reasonable inquiry and have reasonable grounds to believe
either that "the offeree has such knowledge and experience in finan-
cial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits
and risks of the prospective investment," or that the offeree and his
offeree representative together have such knowledge. 5
On its face, this provision introduces the familiar uncertain
standards that are characteristic of the rule as a whole and represent
one of its principal defects. In the words of one of the many com-
mentators who have criticized the subjectivity and vagueness of this
sophistication concept, it is "elusive, complex and subjective."'"
43. Commenting on the treatment of advertising and solicitation for sales and resales
under the proposed limited offering section of the Code, the Reporters have noted that the
prohibition makes it:
Unlawful for any offeror or reseller in a limited offering to engage in "general
advertising" in contravention of the Commission's rules. That provision [§
503(b)] is designed to preserve something of the old prohibition of public offerings
without perpetuating that difficult concept. On the other hand, precisely because
the concept of "general advertising" is inevitably vague, the provision is phrased
as a prohibition rather than a condition of the exemption, so that a violation,
though subjecting the violator to the usual public sanctions, does not impose an
absolute civil liability on the seller in an action for rescission or damages under
the successor to Sec. Act. § 12(1).
FED. SEC. CODE § 227, Comment (2)(b) (Apr. 1972 Tent. Draft No. 1).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(1) (1978).
45. Id. § 230.146(d)(2). See notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
46. Wolfson, supra note 2, at 1505. For further criticism of the sophistication require-
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
According to another critic, "[pirobably the most significant ele-
ments of uncertainty, which render the entire rule inadequate in
light of its avowed purpose [to provide more objective standards],
are the indefinite terms 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' which ap-
pear at least fourteen times in the new rule." 7
In adopting the rule, the Commission stated that it "believes
that the determination of 'ability to bear the economic risk' will
vary with the circumstances."48 Considerations which the Commis-
sion indicated are important are "whether the offeree could afford
to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite period, and whether,
at the time of the investment, he could afford a complete loss."4"
One of the practical problems presented by the rule is the high
cost of compliance. The cost of the paperwork and documentation
required to meet the test of offeree sophistication is a significant
part of the costs and burdens of the private placement exemption.'
The innovative concept of "offeree representative" contained in
the rule does not solve the problem of uncertainty inherent in the
sophistication and economic risk tests. Although the offeree who can
bear the economic risk can satisfy his or her sophistication require-
ment by employing an offeree representative, the representative
ments of rule 146, see Temple, Securities: The Private Offering Exemption and Rule 146, 35
MONT. L. REV. 299 (1974); Comment, Proposed SEC Rule 146: The Quest for Objectivity, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (1973); Comment, The Private Offering: Rule 146 and Offeree
Sophistication, 25 ME. L. REV. 295 (1973).
47. Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240 - Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV.
37, 67-68 (1975). Kessler notes that "[o]ne need not be familiar with the two famous 'due
diligence' cases under the 1933 Act to appreciate the uncertainty inherent in standards such
as 'reasonable grounds for belief,' 'reasonable investigation,' and the like." Id. at 68 (footnote
omitted). The two cases referred to are illustrative of the uncertainty which results from the
injection of a reasonableness standard. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 576-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("reasonable investigation" and "reasonable grounds
to believe" will vary with the degree of individual's involvement, expertise and access to data
and information); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(due diligence defenses of issuer, officers, directors, underwriters, and auditors).
48. SEC Release No. 33-5487, [1973-74] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
49. Id. In the Adopting Release, the Commission also noted that the ability to invest
$150,000 applies only to the provision excluding individuals from the total number of purchas-
ers, not to the economic risk test. Id.
50. It has been estimated that there are 20 separate procedural paperwork requirements
in connection with the rule. Letter of Comment on Proposed Rule 146 from C. Schneider and
C. Zall to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 15, 1973), reprinted in 119731 228
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-11. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 769-72 (finding only 15 such
requirements).
It has been suggested that to satisfy these obligations, the issuer should obtain, immedi-
ately prior to making an offer, responses to a written questionnaire outlining the offeree's
educational background and formal training, his business experience, and his experience in
purchasing securities, including privately placed securities. The questionnaire should also
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must have "such knowledge and experience in financial and busi-
ness matters that he, either alone, or with other offeree representa-
tives or the offeree, is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment."5 The subjective language defining the
capability of the offeree representative is identical to that used for
offerees. Furthermore, both the issuer and any person acting on its
behalf must have an actual belief based upon reasonable grounds
through reasonable inquiry that the offeree representative is quali-
fied.5"
The offeree representative, in addition to being sophisticated,
must not be "an affiliate, director, officer, or other employee of the
issuer, or beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of. . .the equity
securities or 10 percent or more of the equity interest in the issuer."' '
The rule also requires the offeree representative to disclose, in writ-
ing, any "material relationship" with the issuer during the past two
years and any compensation received or anticipated as a result of
that relationship. While the concept of offeree representative may
have practical utility in situations where professional investors have
retained investment counselors, too many questions and resulting
pitfalls remain for the concept to give much comfort to a small
issuer attempting to comply with all the provisions of rule 146.5
The Code rids the limited offering of all such requirements
relating to the sophistication of offerees. In fact, the Code is not
concerned with offerees and focuses only upon purchasers. Purchas-
ers are limited only by number, not by sophistication or affluence. "
The comments in the Code suggest that the departure from concern
over offerees is justified because nonpurchasing offerees suffer no
injury. 7 Restraint is still imposed on the breadth of the offering
through retention of the prohibition of general advertising.?' By fo-
cusing solely upon the number of purchasers, "the Code adds preci-
call for a balance sheet and net worth statement similar to those required by banks for
personal loans, and a profile of the offeree's investment portfolio. The issuer should seek the
offeree's authorization to make inquiries of banks, broker-dealers, and others to verify the
data given in the questionnaire. Green & Wittner, supra note 22, at 9.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1)(ii) (1978).
52. Id. § 230.146(a)(1).
53. Id. § 230.146(a)(1)(i). This is so except where the offeree and his offeree representa-
tive are related in certain specified ways.
54. Id. § 230.146(a)(1)(iv).
55. For example, the vagueness of the term "material" is apparent from its definition
as "any relationship that a reasonable investor might consider important in the making of
the decision whether to acknowledge a person as his offeree representative." Id. §
230.146(a)(4).
56. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b).
57. Id. § 227, Comment (2)(b) (Apr. 1972 Tent. Draft No. 1).
58. Id. § 503(b).
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sion to a subjective and troublesome aspect of the section 4(2) ex-
emption [and rule 146]."' 51
On its face, the limited offering exemption of the Code seems
to better accommodate the financing needs of small and large corpo-
rations than does the current exemption for private placements.
When the issuer is not a one-year registrant, however, the Commis-
sion is given the power to modify the conditions of the limited offer-
ing or to impose additional conditions considering "(A) the type of
issuer and security, (B) the kind of market if any, and (C) similar
criteria."6 0 At least some commentators believe this permits the
Commission to reimpose the sophistication and information deliv-
ery requirements of rule 146,1' thus subjecting small issuers to more
rigorous requirements under the private placement exemption than
large issuers and subjecting all issuers to the elusiveness of such
concepts. On the other hand, the Proposed Official Draft represents
a major improvement over earlier Tentative Drafts which would
have given broad rulemaking authority to the Commission for one-
year registrants as well.2
The departure of the Code from the Ralston Purinal3 doctrine
through the abandonment of the sophistication and relationship
tests has also been criticized for placing "the entire burden of inves-
tor protection upon its antifraud provisions and upon applicable
state blue sky laws." 6' As James Cheek has stated: "Under the
Code's approach, the purchasers of a limited offering can be thirty-
five widows and orphans who are thoroughly unsophisticated
strangers, and who are unable to bear the economic risk of their
investment.""' Thus, some commentators believe that certainty is
59. Cheek, Exemptions Under the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV.
355, 364 (1977).
60. FED. SEC. CODE § 252(b)(3).
61. Wolfson; supra note 2, at 1504. See also Bialkin, supra note 10, at 338.
62. The first tentative draft of the Code gave the Commission power to modify the
conditions of a limited offering or impose additional conditions with respect to all registrants.
That draft provided that the Commission need only consider, among other criteria, whether
the issuer was a one-year registrant. FED. SEC. CODE § 227(b)(3) (Apr. 1972 Tent. Draft No.
1). The current proposed draft specifically limits this rulemaking power of the Commission
to non-one-year registrants. Id. § 242(b)(3).
63. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The Court rejected the Commis-
sion's suggestion that a private placement exemption should not be available to offerings to
a large number of persons as a matter of statutory interpretation. Id. at 125. The Court
emphasized the purpose of the Securities Act, holding that the applicability of the private
offering exemption "should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the Act." Id. When the focus of inquiry is "the need of the offerees for the
protection afforded by registration," id. at 127, the Court indicated that "the exemption
question turns on the knowledge of the offerees." Id. at 126. See also note 21, supra.
64. Cheek, supra note 59, at 364.
65. Id.
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procured at too high a price; while the antifraud provisions would
provide a remedy for the worst abuses, the degree of disclosure
required by these provisions is unclear."
C. Access to or Furnishing of Information
Rule 146(e) provides that an offeree must have access to or
receive the same type of information that registration would dis-
close, as well as additional information necessary to verify what the
offeree has received. 7 The preliminary note to rule 146(e) provides
that access can only exist by reason of an offeree's employment or
family relationship or economic bargaining power with respect to
the issuer."
The access requirement has been criticized for protecting those
who do not need its protection and for doing little to reduce uncer-
tainty or to provide more objective standards." The concept is rela-
tively simple if the issuer is dealing with an "insider"-an institu-
tion or a venture capital firm which possesses sufficient economic
bargaining power to be an access offeree. In other cases, because the
determination of the requisite relationship is so uncertain, the only
safe alternative for an issuer is to furnish the information and not
to rely upon access as a substitute.70 Since the issuer must comply
with paragraph (e)(2) and give the offeree "the opportunity to ask
questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer. . . and to obtain
any additional information . . . necessary to verify"'" the informa-
tion previously received, the burden is ultimately greater than regis-
tration. Furthermore, because no one can say with certainty how
much additional information is enough, attempted compliance
often becomes even riskier than a registered offering.72
66. In his article, Cheek suggests that "[als a practical matter, an individual purchaser
is better protected if the sale to him destroys the availability of the limited offering exemption
and thereby sdbjects the seller to civil liability without the problems of proof involved in an
antifraud claim." Id. Cf. Casey, supra note 22, at 593, (suggesting that misrepresentations
are more appropriately dealt with by the antifraud provisions, with the remedy of damages,
rather than by rescission of the entire deal). See also Comment, Revising the Private Place-
ment Exemption, 92 YALE L.J. 1512, 1524 (1973).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1). The Adopting Release explains that the term "access" is
used in the rule "in the same sense that it has been used by the courts and the Commission
in the past-to refer to the offeree's position with respect to the issuer." SEC Release No.
33-5487, [1973-741 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974). The same release,
however, also states that "the Commission is of the view that an offeree need not be an insider
such as an officer or director of the issuer" to have the requisite access. Id.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1978).
69. See Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 206. See also Kripke, supra note 22, at 6, col. 3.
70. See Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 206; Kripke, supra note 22 at 6, col. 3.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(2) (1978).
72. See Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 205-06.
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The access provision of rule 146 contains a modification of the
information requirements for issuers required to report under the
1934 Act. 3 In addition, an ameliorative provision for nonreporting
issuers is included, 4 which because it is also couched in vague
terms, does little to lessen the burden of providing each offeree with
a virtual registration statement. An issuer who is not a reporting
company under sections 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act may condense
the registration information or omit details, but only if such issuer
can show that "under the circumstances, the omitted information
is not material or the condensation of information does not render
the statements made misleading.""3 "Therefore, only a foolhardy
issuer's lawyer would rely on the permission to omit or condense
where his client has the burden of proof of nonmateriality.) 7'
As previously noted, the Code is unconcerned with offerees and
thus the limited offering exemption has no provisions concerning
access or information to be delivered to purchasers other than the
potential for such a requirement for issuers who are not one-year
registrants under the Commission's rulemaking authority.7 7 One of
the most troublesome aspects of the provisions of the Code, from the
practitioner's standpoint, will be the determination of the scope of
information to be furnished to investors to avoid liability under the
antifraud rules.
The groundwork has already been laid under the section 4(2)
exemption for investor protection through use of the antifraud pro-
visions. In Steir v. Smith,"8 the Fifth Circuit held that the sale of
unregistered stock to a sophisticated purchaser, subject to the oc-
currence of a public offering, violated rule 10b-5 when the seller
failed to inform the buyer of information about the public offering
which would have influenced the buyer's decision.
The antifraud rule was applied to purchasers of unregistered
securities sold in a distribution that had failed to qualify for a sec-
tion 4(2) exemption in Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co."5 The Fifth Circuit
held that rule 10b-5 does provide a remedy where an issuer's failure
73. Such an issuer may supply the information contained in the annual report required
under the Exchange Act or a registration statement on Form S-1 or on Form 10, whichever
filing is the most recent, and the information contained in any proxy statement filed since
the filing of such annual report or registration statement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(a)(1)
(1978).
74. Id. § 230.146(e)(1)(b).
75. Id. § 230.146(e)(1)(b)(1).
76. Kessler, supra note 47, at 68.
77. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(3).
78. [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,768 (5th Cir. 1973).
79. 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
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to disclose all the information that compliance with Schedule A
would have revealed becomes, at a certain point, "'an act, practice
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit' upon the offerees, in violation of the third clause of [rule
10b-5]." 8° The rationale of the court for this extension in Woolf was:
Under any view of how far 10b-5 should extend, the area of pri-
vate offerings of securities under the exemption afforded by § 4(2)
of the 1933 Act is so closely related to the fairness of the public
and private securities markets and the allocation of investment
capital that it must come within the scope of the rule."
The SEC has stated that section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act are violated when an
issuer, in connection with the private placement of securities, fails
to inform fully the purchaser as to "the circumstances under which
he is required to take and hold the securities." 2
Indeed, to remedy a failure to comply with rule 146 or the
statutory exemption for private offerings by awarding rescission for
nonregistration either aborts too many small financings or forces
them into a registration process which is not appropriate and was
never intended for them. Simple business deals between a few peo-
ple-where a 10b-5 action would be an adequate remedy for any
misrepresentation, overreaching, or other fraud-should be made
safe without imposing the time-consuming and expensive registra-
tion requirements. s3 Furthermore, although most of the cases de-
cided since Ralston Purina were resolved in favor of purchasers of
stock seeking rescission, "[t]hese decisions should have turned on
an uncamouflaged acknowledgment that the facts showed a clearly
public distribution or an offering tainted by omissions or misrepre-
sentations or both. "
The problem of relying upon the antifraud provisions in this
area, however, is the potential for runaway holdings by the courts
80. Id. at 608 (quoting rule 10b-5(3)).
81. Id. at 607.
82. SEC Release Nos. 33-5226, 34-9444, [1971-72] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,483, at
81,036 (Jan. 10, 1972).
See also Bailey v. Huntington Securities Co., 35 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (conspiracy
to avoid registration part of a 10b-5 claim); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (concealment of fact that stock was unregistered).
83. Casey, supra note 22, at 593.
84. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
Although there are few cases applying rule 10b-5 to private placement disclosure, there
are numerous instances where 10b-5 has been successfully invoked for omissions or misrepre-
sentations in a registration statement or prospectus. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE 10b-5 § 6.2(200)-(300) (1977).
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or overly expansive Commission rules which expand the duty to
disclose because of the lack of access and/or information and sophis-
tication requirements. By so doing, it is possible that the certainty
sought to be afforded to issuers under the Code could be greatly
reduced.
D. Number of Purchasers and Limitations Imposed on Disposition
Rule 146 modifies the pre-Ralson Purina rule of thumb used by
the SEC to determine the number of permissible offerees (twenty-
five) "5 by increasing the number to thirty-five and by making the
limitation applicable to purchasers instead of offerees. The pur-
chaser's spouse, relatives living in the same house, trusts, estates or
corporations in which they have the entire interest, or purchasers of
$150,000 worth of securities need not be included in the thirty-five.""
The sophistication and information requirements apply, however, to
all purchasers. 7 Under the original version of the rule, a good faith
issuer, who had exercised reasonable care in determining the num-
ber of purchasers, faced a potential loss of the exemption if one of
the purchasers deceived him by purchasing for other accounts. In
1975, rule 146 was amended to provide that "[t]he issuer shall have
reasonable grounds to believe, and after making reasonable inquiry,
shall believe, that there are no more than thirty-five purchasers."',,
Unfortunately, this improvement was cast in the same uncertain
standards of "reasonableness" that are characteristic of the rule.
8
"
Rule 146(h) requires the issuer and any person acting on its
behalf to exercise "reasonable care" to assure that the purchasers
are not "underwriters," 90 and sets forth the minimum standard that
85. See note 20, supra.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(i) (1978).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 230.146(g)(1) (as amended by 40 Fed. Reg. 21,710 (1975)).
89. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
90. "Underwriters" is defined here by reference to the definition contained in section
2(11) of the 1933 Act, as follows:
(11) The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect under-
writing of any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose
interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of
the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this
paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under
direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976).
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the issuer must meet in order to carry the burden of "reasonable
care." In addition, the issuer must also fulfill the rule 146(e) re-
quirement that it inform each offeree in writing that the securities
are restricted and may not be resold unless registered or exempted
from registration.2
The Code is similar to rule 146 in that the number of purchasers
who may buy under its limited offering is also thirty-five, but the
number of institutional investors is unlimited." Moreover, unlike
the private placement exemption of section 4(2) and rule 146, the
exemption is not limited to issuers but applies to secondary resales
as well.9 ' Under the Code, no resales may be made that result, at
any one time, in more than thirty-five owners of the securities sold
in the limited offering, excluding institutional investors and those
who become owners by means other than through purchase.'" This
restriction applies for three years after the last sale to any initial
buyer unless the issuer is a one-year registrant at the time of a
particular resale, in which case the restrictive period is one year.
This is significantly different from rule 146 in that the issuer need
not concern itself with the investment intent of the purchaser. Thus,
"[riesales may be made immediately and frequently during the
applicable restrictive period if the maximum number of owners does
not exceed thirty-five."'"
The Commission, in section 242(b)(3), is given power to modify
or impose additional conditions upon the resale provisions if the
issuer is' not a one-year registrant. In addition, the Commission is
also given rulemaking power in section 242(b)(4) to require that the
seller or any reseller obtain an appropriate undertaking from the
buyer that the security be subject to appropriate restrictions on
transferability and "that any transfer agent be given an appropriate
stop-transfer notice, in each case designed to avoid a distribution
that would violate section 502(a).' ' 97
91. "Reasonable care" includes making reasonable inquiry into the purchaser's purpose
in acquiring the securities, placing restrictive legends on the certificates, making appropriate
"stop transfer" notations and instructions with the issuer and/or transfer agent, and obtain-
ing a letter of investment intent from the purchaser. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(h) (1978). This is,
however, expressly noted as being a non-exclusive list of requirements. Id.
92. Id. § 230.146(e)(3)(ii).
93. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(1)(A). Allowing an unlimited number of institutional inves-
tors will have a practical effect similar to the exclusion of large purchasers (over $150,000)
from the 35 in rule 146. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(d).
94. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(1)(B).
95. Id.
96. Cheek, supra note 59, at 366.
97. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(4). Id. § 502(a) is equivalent to § 5 of the 1933 Act which
requires registration of a security unless it is exempted. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976).
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The new approach to resales is not without problems. The re-
seller may have difficulty:
in determining when the restrictive period begins and ends and
whether thirty-five or fewer owners, other than institutions or
recipients of securities in nonsale transactions, are involved. The
latter problem is particularly complex because the term 'owner'
rather than 'persons' is used and because the term includes indi-
rect as well as direct ownership, thus requiring an issuer or re-
seller to ferret out the number of beneficial, indirect owners when
the record owner is a nominee, partnership, or similar entity2
The Code, however, protects an issuer or reseller from liability
if such person acts in good faith reliance upon a statement from his
buyer as to the number and nature of the owners, the issuer's status
as a one-year registrant or the date which concludes the restricted
period." Here, again, the Official Draft represents a marked im-
provement over earlier Tentative Drafts that were subject to criti-
cism for not providing this protection.0s
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the treatment of the lim-
ited offering exemption in the proposed Federal Securities Code
substantially resolves the major difficulties that have plagued the
securities bar over the years. Although the uncertain application of
the antifraud rules still has an impact upon the scope of the infor-
mation required to be furnished to investors, in most respects there
will be objective standards that appear to strike a reasonable bal-
ance between the need for private investment capital and the need
to protect investors.
III. TENDER OFFERS
Analysis of the tender offer provisions is a more difficult task
than that presented by limited offerings. Not only has the law in
98. Cheek, supra note 59, at 366 (footnote omitted).
99. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(7).
100. In Tentative Draft No. 1, § 227(b)(7) read:
An original seller or reseller who in good faith accepts from his buyer a written
undertaking that is reasonably, designed to avoid an illegal distribution and com-
plies with any rules adopted under paragraph (4) is not considered to be a partici-
pant in any such distribution.
Id. § 227(b)(7) (Apr. 1972 Tent. Draft No. 1). Protection for a reseller who acted in "good
faith reliance on a statement by the issuer or its transfer agent with regard to the number
and institutional nature of current owners of the securities sold in the limited offering" was
included later. Id. (Oct. 1974 Reporter's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3) (emphasis
added). Under the Official Draft of the Code, the reseller is also protected if he acts in good
faith reliance on a statement concerning "the date when the one-year or three-year period
(as the case may be) . . .ends .... " Id. § 242(b)(7).
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this area been expanding at a rapid pace, but numerous provisions
of the Code appear to be in conflict with the views of the Commis-
sion. Because it is likely that changes will be made in the Code
provisions prior to adoption by Congress, it is far more difficult to
determine whether the final result will reflect the same level of
objective standards as are presented for limited offerings and main-
tain the balance of interests originally sought by the Williams Act.""
A. Preemption
Section 1904(c) of the Code states that the tender offer provi-
sions are "exclusive and plenary" to the extent that these sections
involve a Code "registrant.' '0 But if the target company is not a
registrant or if, with respect to any state, "(A) the registrant to
whose security holders the tender offer is directed has its principal
place of business and (B) more than 50 percent of the record or
beneficial holders of its outstanding voting securities holding more
than 50 percent of those securities are residents, '"3 then the state
tender offer statutes are not preempted. To some commentators, the
preemption of state takeover statutes is "the single most important
channel made by the Code" in this area because "the recent prolif-
eration of state takeover statutes has had a chilling effect on tender
offers." ' The Code, however, has also changed the federal substan-
tive provisions relating to tender offers by adding several character-
istics of the state laws, such as the definition of the term "tender
offer,"' 0 5 the requirements of prospective filing,' " the publication of
advance notice, 07 and the provision for extended offer periods."'
According to Professor Loss, "the only way politically" that the
drafters of the Code could prempt "the thirty-five state statutes,
which are blatantly pro-management, . . . was to tighten up some-
101. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1976).
102. See note 26, supra.
103. FED. SEC. CODE § 1904(c). Obviously, this exception will apply to a limited category
of target companies. It should be noted that the only state laws displaced by the Code are
those regulating tender offer transactions as tender offers. Thus, ordinary blue sky require-
ments concerning the sale side of an exchange tender offer will be unaffected.
104. Law, Post Registration Provisions of the Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV.
411, 425 (1970). See also Gould and Jacobs, supra note 15, at 399; Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1976).
105. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68..
106. Id. § 606(d)(1).
107. Id. § 606(d)(2).
108. Id. § 606(e).
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what."'' 9 When Congress adopted the Williams Act in 1968, only one
state regulated tender offers." 0 This being the case, there was no
reason expressly to preempt state legislation in this area, and, when
necessary, reliance could be had on section 28(a) of the 1934 Act if
any potential conflicts arose."' Now, depending upon which com-
mentator one reads, there are between thirty-one and thirty-seven
states that regulate such transactions."2 With this proliferation of
state laws, there has also been a growing body of criticism of these
statutes based primarily upon what is perceived as a substitution
of an antitakeover philosophy by the states for the Williams Act's
deliberate neutrality among the contestants in a tender offer.' ' :"
The conflict between federal and state laws culminated with
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell. "4 There, the court held that the Idaho takeover statute was
preempted by the Williams Act and created an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce." ' In reaching its holding on
109. Panel Discussion, Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1519, 1537 (1979).
110. VA. CODE § 13.10528-.10541 (Supp. 1970). When the first tentative Draft of §§ 605(b)
to 607 of the Code was approved, only Nevada and Ohio had joined Virginia with legislation
in this area.
111. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part: "Nothing in this chapter
shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
112. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
113. See Bartell, TRENDS IN FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE ALl FEDERAL
SECURITIES IN FEDERAL OR STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE HEIGHTENING
BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1978); J. Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58
MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975). See also authorities cited in note 104 supra.
114. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).
115. Id. at 1280, 1286. Since this decision, almost every contested takeover offer now
includes a challenge to the legal validity of the law of any state which may have some possible
connection with the offer. Thus, the Supreme Court's reversal on grounds of improper venue
does not put an end to the issue of the validity of state takeover laws. See, e.g., Dart Industries
Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indiana and Delaware laws unconstitutional
and preempted); proposed offer by Daylan, Inc., for stock of Uarco, wherein the Federal
District Court of the Northern District of Illinois enjoined the application of the Illinois
tender offer statute. Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [1979] 519 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at
A-2 (E.D. Va. 1979) (invalidating Virginia's takeover statute).
Recently, however, there have been indications that the courts may reconsider the issue
of the constitutionality of the state takeover statutes. For example, in UV Indus., Inc. v.
Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Me. 1979), the court issued a preliminary injunction against
an offeror for alleged violations of Maine's takeover statute, declining to decide at that time
whether or not the statute was unconstitutional. More recently, in City Ifivesting Co. v.
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preemption grounds, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the conflict between
the Idaho takeover statute and the Williams Act."' The court con-
cluded that the Idaho statute favored the target company and in-
cumbent management. Thus, it was so inconsistent with the pur-
poses and objectives of Congress"7 that the state law was an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of such objectives.
The issue to be resolved is whether the Code is incorporating
those aspects of state legislation that would improvethe regulatory
scheme without sacrificing neutrality or merely facilitating the
preemption contemplated by section 1904(c)."1 The observation has
been made, for example, that "one might have thought that codi-
fiers who wanted to reexamine matters with an eye toward improv-
ing investor protection without interfering with honest business
would have been reluctant to add to the burdens of those making
tender offers" by including state characteristics which are, in the
drafters' own words, "blatantly pro-management.""' What such
criticism fails to recognize, however, is that the new tender offer
rules which have been proposed by the SEC and which have been
Simox, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,942 (S.D. Ind. 1979), the court upheld the
constitutionality of Indiana's takeover statute. In a conclusory opinion, the court simply
noted that the state statute was not "an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purpose of
the Williams Act," and that it was not preempted by virture of provisions "different from
those chosen by Congress in enacting the Williams Act." Id. at 95,946.
116. The Fifth Circuit applied the tests enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940) and reapplied more recently in Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in the same
field nevertheless override state laws with which they may conflict . . . .The
criterion for determining whether state and federal laws are so inconsistent that
the state laws must give way is firmly established in our decisions. Our task is
'to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the
State's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941) . . . .This inquiry requires us to consider the relationship between state
and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are
written.
Id. at 525-26 (citations omitted).
117. The stated purpose of the Williams Act was to protect investors. See Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). This goal was to be accomplished by requiring that
regulatory schemes remain neutral and therefore there must be "extreme care to avoid tipping
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
118. See notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra.
119. West, supra note 2, at 1489.
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commended for their "thoroughness, orderliness and precision,""',
go much further than the Code in many respects in "tipping the
balance in favor of the target." Thus, notwithstanding the adoption
of the Code, prospective bidders might still be faced with a set of
new rules that are far more onerous than those necessary to further
investor protection.
Moreover, because the recommendations of the SEC will be
crucial in determining whether the Code provisions concerning
tender offers are adopted by Congress, political pressures of a practi-
cal sort are posed by the Commission's views as reflected in the
Proposed Rules. Although Professor Loss has "little doubt that [the
drafters] shall achieve agreement with the SEC,"'' the timing of
the Proposed Rules has a direct relationship to the submission of the
Code to Congress.
Although the SEC cannot preempt state law through its rule-
making powers, and is therefore bound by section 28(a) of the 1934
Act, it is likely that the SEC will agree with the drafters of the Code
concerning preemption of state takeover laws. 2 In addition, both
the drafters of the Code and the SEC seem to be in agreement that
tender offers must remain open for a longer time than is presently
alowed by the Williams Act. Even though the Code and the Pro-
posed Rules differ in their implementation of this objective, it is
likely that the Commission and the drafters will be able to reach
some compromise that is satisfactory to both sides. A major area of
concern that remains a problem, however, is whether the SEC will
be willing to accept the definition of "tender offer" in the Code.
B. Definition of "Tender Offer"
The Williams Act does not attempt to define "tender offer" and
120. Sommer, supra note 13, at 25, col. 4.
121. Loss, supra note 2, at 1449.
122. In its discussion of proposed rule 14e-l(a), which would require that any tender offer
must remain open for at least 30 business days, the SEC notes that the "excessively short
duration" of tender offers permitted under the Williams Act "may have provided part of the
stimulus for some of the 36 states which have enacted antitakeover statutes since 1968." The
Commission believes that although the "attempt to alleviate the problem was laudable," it:
has resulted in an inconsistent, overlapping and often counterproductive pattern
of regulation and in many instances may have tipped the carefully construed
[sici balance between bidder and subject company envisioned by the Williams
Act in favor of [thel subject company. Accordingly, the Commission believes
that a uniformly applied federal regulation would better serve the purposes and
policies of the Williams Act, including the interests of investors.
SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, [Currentl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,935 at 81,236
(Feb. 5, 1979) (emphasis added).
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until quite recently the SEC had consistently declined to define the
term.'23 In February of 1979, the SEC formally took this position in
the context of explaining its proposals for new tender offer rules.'24
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the issue of what consti-
tutes a tender offer,'25 at least in its more unconventional sense, has
been litigated time and time again.' The Code attempts to put an
123. In a 1976 Release, the SEC stated that:
at this time . . . a definition of the term "tender offer" is neither appropriate nor
necessary. This position is premised on the dynamic nature of these transactions
and the need of the Commission to remain flexible in determining what types of
transactions, either present or yet to be devised, are or should be encompassed
by the term. Therefore, the Commission specifically declines to propose a defini-
tion of the term "tender offer."
SEC Release No. 34-12676, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1[ 80,659, at
86,696 (Aug. 2, 1976).
Recently, SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, in an interview with a reporter from the
Securities Regulation & Law Report, stated:
The Commission wants to provide a much certainty [in defining a tender offer]
as possible so people know what the regulatory requirements are. Businessmen
need this so that they'll know how to comply with the laws. At the same time,
this is an area where too specific a definition can easily be circumvented.
[1979] 520 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at AA-9.
The Commission had previously set forth eight factors to determine the existence of a
tender offer. See note 139 infra. When asked why the Commission does not set forth the
eight factors as Commission policy, Evans replied that these factors."are a framework by
which it can be determined whether something is a tender offer. They don't say what a
tender offer is, but they can be used as a measuring stick." [1979] 520 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
at AA-9.
When asked whether the Commission has asked the staff to draw up a definition of a
tender offer, Evans replied that the "staff is trying to evaluate whether a definition could be
workable and what it might be. There has not been a decision to adopt a definition ....
We would want to retain our flexibility and the staff may not be able to come up with
anything that we would accept." Id.
124. [T]he Commission affirms its position that a definition of the term
"tender offer" is neither appropriate nor necessary at this time. The Commission
wishes to emphasize that in its view the term should be understood in a context
which furthers the purposes of the Williams Act. Thus, this position should in no
way be construed to mean that the term applies only to a so called "conventional"
tender offer . . . . In the Commission's view, the term "tender offer" is to be
interpreted flexibly in accordance with the intended purposes of Sections 14(d)
and 14(e) of the Williams Act. Therefore, the determination of whether a transac-
tion or series of transactions constitutes a tender offer depends upon consideration
of the particular facts and circumstances in light of such purposes.
SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15545, IC-10575 (Feb. 5, 1979) reprinted in 16 SEC DOCKET 973,
980 (Feb. 20, 1979). See also Introductory Note to Proposed Regulation 14D, id. at 1012.
125. The conventional meaning of "tender offer" was described in a leading article as
"a publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their
shares for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
126. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974). When confronted with a contested takeover, the Fifth Circuit stated:
In conventional tender offers the offeror typically offers to purchhase all or a
portion of a company's shares at a premium price, the offer to remain open for a
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end to this spate of litigation by defining tender offer as follows:
"Tender Offer" means an offer to buy a security, or a solici-
tation of an offer to sell a security, that is directed to more than
thirty-five persons, unless
(1) it (A) is incidental to the execution of a buy order by a
broker, or to a purchase by a dealer who performs no more than
the usual function of a broker or dealer, or (B) does no more than
state an intention to make such an offer or solitication, and
(2) satisfies any additional conditions that the Commission
imposes by rule.'27
The question remains, however, whether the new definition of
tender offer in the Code affects the nonconventional methods of
acquiring control, either on the open market or in privately negoti-
ated purchases?
1. OPEN MARKET PURCHASES IN GENERAL
It is well settled that open market purchases'8 of securities do
not per se constitute a tender offer. 2 ' In Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp.,130 Curtiss-Wright purchased nearly 9.9% of
Kennecott's outstanding shares primarily in open market transac-
tions during a four-month period. The court held that these transac-
tions did not constitute a tender offer. According to the court, al-
though Congress and the SEC have deliberately left the definition
limited time. Frequently, the obligation to purchase on the part of the offeror is
conditioned on the aggregate number of shares tendered: if more than a certain
number are tendered, the offeror need not purchase the excess; if less than a
certain number are tendered, the offeror need not purchase any. The shareholder
responding to the offer generally must relinquish control of the shares he desires
to tender until the response of others is determined.
Id. at 597 n.22.
127. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68.
128. For discussions of this area of the law, see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN,
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 10-24 (1977); M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 110-26 (1978); A. FLEISHER, JR., TENDER OFERS:
DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 72-76 (1978); Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing
Concept of "Tender Offer": An Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations
of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 379, 380-88 (1978); Lipton, Open Market Purchases, 32
Bus. LAW. 1321 (1977).
129. See D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, (1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Wilfred P. Cohen Foundation, Inc. v. Prevor, [1974-75
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Water & Wall Assocs.,
Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,943 (D.N.J. 1973).
130. 449 F. Supp. 951, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978).
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of tender offer vague, it was clear that the term embraces more than
formal conventional communications to shareholders. It is, how-
ever, "equally well settled that [open] market purchases of stock,
however aggressive, do not constitute a tender offer. "',, .
Similarly, in Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance,,:"
each of four investors purchased nearly five percent of the outstand-
ing securities of the target in open market transactions during a six-
week period. The court held that a tender offer had not occurred,
and that "open market purchases made without widespread public
knowledge of the purchasers' intention do not constitute a tender
offer."y33
Under the Code, it also appears that open market purchases do
not constitute a tender offer per se. The Code specifically excludes
from the thirty-five person limitation ordinary market transactions
either through a broker or directly with a marketmaker. 4 The Code
explains that "[t]he purpose of § 299.68(a)(1)(A) is to exclude
ordinary market transactions, whether the intermediaries are bro-
kers or dealers.' ' 3 Thus, the Code makes no substantive changes in
this area of the law.
2. PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED PURCHASES IN GENERAL
Under present law, the courts consider various factors in deter-
mining whether privately negotiated purchasesI31 constitute a
tender offer. These factors are, inter alia, the number of sharehold-
ers solicited, the percentage of outstanding shares held by solicitees,
the sophistication of the solicitees, the method of communications
with the solicitees, and the time period which the solicitees are given
to respond. While properly constructed private purchases may not
constitute a tender offer, these criteria are indicative of the confused
state of law in the area of privately negotiated tender offers. The
confusion is illustrated by two conflicting decisions, both by the
Southern District of New York.
In Wellman v. Dickinson, 37 the court stated that the acquisi-
tion by Sun Company of approximately thirty-four percent of th
131. 449 F. Supp. at 961 (emphasis added).
132. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403 (D.D.C. 1978).
133. Id. at 93,429.
134. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68(a)(1)(A) & Note 2.
135. Id. § 299.68 Note 2. Note 2 explains that the usual functions of brokers and dealers
were not meant to be included in the definition of tender offer.
136. A comprehensive discussion of privately negotiated purchases is found in Block &
Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 133 (1978).
137. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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outstanding stock of a target company in negotiated off-market pur-
chases through the solicitation of thirty-nine individuals and insti-
tutions amounted to a tender offer in violation of the filing require-
ments of the Williams Act. In Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities
Ltd., 3 however, the court rejected the argument that a tender offer
had been made even though defendant engaged in a program of
open market purchases, carefully made so as to avoid causing a
price increase, while defendant's brokerage firm solicited purchases
from between thirty and fifty institutional holders and about twelve
large individual holders.
Both cases reviewed the legislative history of the Williams Act
as well as eight factors put forth by the Commission to be considered
in determining whether privately negotiated purchases constitute a
tender offer. 3 ' While the court in Dickinson accepted the Commis-
sion's eight factors, the court in Brascan rejected them, stating
doubts as to "whether the Commission's view constitutes either a
permissible or a desirable interpretation of the [Williams Act].""'
As to permissibility, the court questioned whether the factors ex-
panded congressional intent. Moreover, the factors were considered
too vague and thus would introduce a crippling uncertainty.
The Brascan court reviewed the legislative history of the Wil-
liams Act and concluded that Congress was aware of privately nego-
tiated acquisitions of control and chose not to regulate in this area.'4'
In contrast, the Dickinson court reviewed the same legislative his-
tory and concluded that Congress intended to regulate all transac-
tions having the same effect as a conventional tender offer. 2 To be
sure, while arguments can be made that either case was correctly
decided, it cannot be true that both were correctly decided.'
138. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
139. The eight factors were described and applied in Hoover v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., No.
79-1062A (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979), cited in Wellman v. Dickinson, 96,918 at 95,842. They
are: (1) Whether there is an active and widespread solicitation of shareholders; (2) whether
the solicitation is for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) whether the offered
price is a premium over the market price; (4) whether the terms of the offer are firm rather
than negotiable; (5) whether the offer is contingent upon a tender of a fixed minimum number
of shares; (6) whether the offer is open for only a limited period of time; (7) whether the
offerees are subjected to pressure; and (8) whether public announcements of a purchasing
program concerning the target company precede or accompany a rapid accumulation of large
amounts of target company securities. Id.
140. [Currentl FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,882 at 95,632.
141. Id.
142. Wellman v. Dickinson, 96,918 at 95,839-41.
143. Block & Schwarzfeld, How to End 'Confusion' Under the Williams Act, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
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In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears,' the purchaser made
an "active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders in
person, over the telephone and through the mails,"'' 5 during a six
week period and thereby obtained over seven percent of the shares
outstanding. The court concluded that such activity:
deprived shareholders of information ...which . . . was mate-
rial to their investment decisions, and denied to them the fair
treatment provided by other parts of Section 14[d]. In truth, the
contacts utilized by the defendants seem even more designed
than a general newspaper advertisement, the more conventional
type of "tender offer," to force a shareholder into making a
hurried investment decision without access to information, in
circumvention of the statutory purpose.' 4'
Therefore, these privately negotiated transactions were deemed to
constitute a tender offer.
On the other hand, the purchaser in Nachman Corp. v. Halfred,
Inc., 47 solicited approximately forty of six hundred shareholders
and succeeded in obtaining approximately 7.5% of the outstanding
shares of the target corporation. The solicitees, many of whom were
either directors or substantial shareholders of the target, were
"presumed to be powerful enough not to be pressured .. . into
making uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell.""'4 The court
thus held that these privately negotiated purchases did not consti-
tute a tender offer:
To characterize [the purchaser's] negotiations with a relatively
small and powerful group of shareholders as a tender offer or
tender offers would not serve the purposes of §§ 14(d) and (e). In
fact, to so extend the application of these sections would have a
disruptive effect upon private, negotiated purchases which Con-
gress probably did not intend, . . . and could upset the balance
of burdens upon management and the offeror which the Williams
Act seeks to strike. 49
Finally, in D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway,5" the court
thought that defining a tender offer as "any offer to purchase secu-
144. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated per stipulation, Civil No. 72-152
(W.D. Okla. May 8, 1972).
145. Id. at 1251-52.
146. Id. at 1252.
147. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
148. Id. at 95,592.
149. Id.
150. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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rities likely to pressure shareholders into making uninformed, ill-
considered decisions to sell"' 5 ' was much too broad. Even using the
shareholder impact test, however, the court held that the pur-
chaser's telephone calls to two dozen sophisticated persons, and the
resulting purchases of 97,200 shares from four highly sophisticated
financial institutions, did not amount to a tender offer.' 52
The Code would clarify this area of the law by providing that
an offer to buy a security directed to more than thirty-five persons
is a tender offer.'53 "Person" is defined as including "a natural per-
son, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or in-
strumentality of a government."' 54 Therefore, an offer to no more
than thirty-five persons is not a tender offer, notwithstanding the
amount of pressure or lack of de'isionmaking time involved. In
contrast, an offer to thirty-six or more persons is a tender offer even
if there is no pressure and a sufficient amount of time and informa-
tion is given to the solicitees to allow a fully informed investment
decision. Given the high percentage of institutional owners of com-
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,'55 the definition of
tender offer in the Code would allow effective control of a substan-
tial number of companies to be transferred.
3. OPEN MARKET AND/OR PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED PURCHASES
ACCOMPANIED BY PUBLICITY
Until quite recently, it was unclear whether open market and/or
privately negotiated purchases, which by themselves probably
would not constitute a tender offer, could be transformed into one
by means of accompanying publicity. In the unreported case of
Loews Corp. v. Aceident & Casualty Insurance Co., '56 the purchaser
made a public announcement of its intention to acquire target com-
pany stock. The court, without explaining its reasoning, enjoined
the acquiring company from making future acquisitions of target
company stock in "block purchases, private purchases off the mar-
ket or any purchases other than open market purchases."'57 On the
151. Id. at 96,563.
152. In light of the conflict in the case law, the SEC has recently reversed its position
and asked its staff to draft a rule to settle the difficult question of what constitutes a tender
offer. Wall St. J., July 18, 1979, at 1, col. 2. See note 123, supra.
153. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68(a).
154. Id. § 299.24(a).
155. Block & Schwarzfeld, supra note 136, at 138.
156. No. 74-C-1396 (N.D. III. Aug. 20, 1974).
157. Loews Corp. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., slip op. at 12 (emphasis added) (as cited
in Einhorn & Blackburn, supra note 128, at 387.
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other hand, the court in Nachman' stated in dictum that "there
is no evidence that the market purchases were preceded by any
public announcement which might have caused them to be a tender
offer,"' 59 implying that open market purchases preceded by public-
ity may constitute a tender offer. One of the latest reported deci-
sions in this area, S-G Securities, Inc. v. The Fuqua Investment
Co., 's" is consistent with Nachman.
In Fuqua, the purchases were preceded by widely publicized
press releases explaining the buying program. 6' Despite the fact
that sellers in the privately negotiated transactions (as opposed to
the open market sales) appeared to be sophisticated (some, indeed,
were arbitragers) and had knowledge that the acquirer was seeking
control, the court still held that:
1) a publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire
a substantial block of the stock of the target company for pur-
poses of acquiring control there; and
2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the purchaser of' large
blocks of stock through open market and privately negotiated
purchases; ...constitute a tender offer. 62
158. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,455 (N.D. I1. 1973).
159. Id. at 95,592 (citing Note, supra note 125, at 1279).
160. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 (D. Mass. 1978).
161. Id. at 94,936.
162. Id. The court based its decision on the purposes underlying the Williams Act:
The legislative history [of the Williams Act] indicates that the defendants'
open market and privately negotiated purchases per se do not come within the
ambit of the statute. . . . In each of the cited cases, however, the purchases in
question were consummated prior to any widespread public announcement of a
conventional tender offer or an independent buying program proposed or actual.
In two of the aforementioned opinions, the courts specifically observed that the
market purchases in question were made prior to any public announcement and
without any widespread public knowledge of the purchasers' intention that would
result in a tender offer subject to the Williams Act.
Defendants' purchases, in the case at bar, were preceded by two and, in part,
by three widely publicized. press releases issued by defendants that outlined with
some specificity the details of the proposed buying program.
The publicity created a risk of the pressure on sellers that the disclosure and
remedial tender offer provisions of the Williams Act were designed to prevent
... .The conditional language in which defendants' proposals were couched
does not obviate the public shareholders' need for the protections of the tender
offer provisions of the Williams Act once such proposals have been made public
with the specificity and apparent genuineness evident in this case.
Id. at 94,935-36 (footnote and citations omitted). See also note 117 supra.
Fuqua made a subsequent offer for the Hoover Company, which resulted in the SEC
charge that Fuqua made a "firm tender offer" when it sent letters to some of the Hoover
family members offering to buy their stock, which amounted to forty-one percent of the shares
of the Hoover Company. This activity was accompanied by numerous press releases emanat-
ing from both Hoover and Fuqua. Fuqua settled the suit by agreeing to set up an acquisitions
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In comparison to the present case law, the Code's thirty-five
person test makes no reference to the effect of publicity on open
market purchases or privately negotiated transactions. The SEC is
given rulemaking authority'63 that would enable it to promulgate
regulations dealing with publicity. Yet, apparently this authority
will only enable the SEC to exclude from the tender offer definition
those transactions that would otherwise constitute a tender offer
under the thirty-five person test.
4. INTEGRATION: THE CREEPING TENDER OFFER
An acquirer will often make purchases of target company stock
in the open market or by means of negotiated transactions prior to
formally announcing a tender offer. The courts, however, have re-
fused to hold that these prior purchases will be integrated with the
subsequent tender offer so that the actual tender offer will be
deemed to have begun on the date of the initial purchases. 'i 4
In Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.,"' the acquirer bought less than five percent of the target's
stock in open market purchases during a one year period prior to its
tender offer announcement. The court refused to integrate the prior
market purchases with the tender offer, stating that "the 5 percent
limit -included in Section 14(d) permits that amount to be pur-
chased in the open market without regard to any subsequent tender
offer."1' 6
Similar results have been reached with respect to negotiated
purchases made prior to a tender offer, despite the acquirer's private
communication of its intent to make a tender offer. In Sunshine
Mining Co. v. Great Western United Corps.,"7 the acquirer notified
the New York Stock Exchange on March 18, 1977 that it intended
to purchase more than five percent of the target company's stock
from two shareholders and then to make a tender offer. Later that
day, the acquirer consummated the privately negotiated purchase.
committee to review future acquisitions, filings and public statements to determine whether
Fuqua would be in violation of any securities law. SEC v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., [1979] 518
SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-1.
163. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68(a)(2).
164. For discussions of this area of the law, see M. LIPTON & E. STEINSERGER, TAKEOVERS
AND FREEZEOUTS 123-26 (1978); H. EINHORN, WHAT IS A "TENDER OFFER"? (Tenth Annual
Institute on Securities Regulation (PLI)) 333, 441-43, 358-63 (1978).
165. 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
166. 356 F. Supp. at 1074. Accord Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
167. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,049 (D. Idaho 1977).
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Three days later, the acquirer issued a press release announcing a
tender offer for up to approximately thirty-four percent of the target
company's outstanding stock. The court refused to integrate the
private purchase and the tender offer, stating that the prior pur-
chase of more than five percent of the target's stock from the two
shareholders was "a transaction separate and independent from the
proposed tender offer announced by [the acquirer] and was con-
summated prior to any public announcement of the proposed tender
offer by [the acquirer] and is not a part of that offer."'' 8
The definitional section of the Code could apply to certain of
these purchases prior to formal tender offers. In defining multiple
tender offers, the Code states that:
A tender offer is separate from any other tender offer (or from an
offer to buy a security, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a secu-
rity, that is directed to not more than thirty-five persons) if (1)
it is for a different class of securities, or (2) it is for additional
securities of the same class but is substantially distinct on the
basis of such factors as manner, time, purpose, price, and kind
of consideration.169
An acquirer, therefore, can avoid the integration problem if its pre-
tender offer purchases result from offers that are substantially dis-
tinct from the tender offer. The distinction is to be made on the
basis of factors such as "manner, time, purpose, price and kind of
consideration." Arguably, open market and privately negotiated
purchases are substantially distinct in manner from formal tender
offers, at least when they are not accompanied by publicity. Fur-
thermore, depending upon the circumstances of each case, there
may be distinctions on the basis of time, purpose, price and type of
consideration. It is in this area, however, that the Commission's
rulemaking power under section 606(c) of the Code could dramati-
cally impact upon pre-tender purchases.
The Commission's Proposed Rules, while not defining open
market or privately negotiated purchases as tender offers, would
regulate such purchases when made prior to a formal tender offer.
Proposed Rule 14e-2(c) would make it a fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice for a bidder to purchase subject com-
pany securities after a determination to make a tender offer which
has not been publicly announced unless the bidder makes a public
168. Id. at 91,721. See also Heine v. The Signal Co., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
169. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.68(b) (emphasis added).
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announcement prior to any such purchase."" Thus, the bidder would
be permitted to "test the market" by buying in the open market so
long as no determination has been made to make the tender offer.
The obvious problem with this rule lies in choosing a method to
ascertain when one has "determined" to make a tender offer.
A more subtle problem arises because Proposed Rule 14e-2(c)
requires disclosure of (i) the identity of the bidder, (ii) the identity
of the subject company, (iii) a statement that the bidder has deter-
mined to make a tender offer for a class of securities of' the subject
company, (iv) the amount of consideration to be offered for each
such security, if determined by the bidder, and (v) the amount of
securities and/or percentages of such class of securities to be sought,
if determined by the bidder. According to the Commission, disclo-
sure of 14e-2(c)(i) through (iii) alone "would not constitute the
commencement of the tender offer . . . and would not be deemed
under present staff interpretations to trigger the application of rule
10b-13."' 17' Disclosure of the information required in 14e-2(c)(iv)
and (v), however, would constitute the commencement of a tender
offer and trigger the operation of rule 10b-13.172
Unfortunately, the information referred to in (iv) and (v) must
be disclosed only if such facts have been determined by the bidder.
Thus, we are once again faced with ascertaining what has been
170. SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,935,
at 81,240 (Feb. 5, 1979).
171. Id. Rule 10b-13 prohibits any person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange oiler
from purchasing the security "otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer or exchange offer,
from the time such tender offer or exchange offer is publicly announced or otherwise made
known by such person to holders of the security to be acquired until the expiration of the
period." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13(a) (emphais added).
The rule also permits written requests to the Commission for exemptions of particular
transactions from the rule so as not to constitute "a manipulative or deceptive service or
contrivance or a fraudulent, or deceptive or manipulative act or practice comprehended
within the purpose of this rule." Id. § 240 10b-13(d).
172. SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,935,
at 81,240 (Feb. 5, 1979).
In addition to a potential rule 10b-13 violation, paragraphs (b) and (c) of Proposed Rule
14d-6 may also violate the prenotification mandates of certain state takeover statutes. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1977).
Under 14d-6(b) a bidder's public announcement or public statement of certain material
terms-such as the identity of the bidder and the subject company and disclosure of the oler
price-would be deemed to commence the tender offer, unless within 5 days of such an-
nouncement the bidder either issues another public announcement stating he has determined
not to continue the offer or complies with the filing requirements and proceeds with dissemi-
nating the disclosure materials to shareholders.
Consequently, the bidder who is subject to the jurisdiction of such a state statute would
be faced with the unpalatable choice of complying with one law and thereby violating an-
other.
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"determined" by the bidder. To be sure, this area will be a fertile
ground for litigation if the Proposed Rules are adopted. In view of
the uncertainties and risks inherent in the Proposed Rules, potential
bidders may be dissuaded not only from making pre-tender pur-
chases but from making tender offers at all.
Insofar as the Code attempts to define the term "tender offer,"
it is in direct conflict with the Commission's stated position that it
would be undesirable to propose a definition at this time. In light
of Proposed Rules 14d-6 and 14e-2(c), it appears that a compromise
will have to be reached with the Commission on this point before
the Code provisions on tender offers can be adopted.
C. Advance Filing and Duration of Offer
One of the principal criticisms of the Williams Act has been
directed at the brief period afforded shareholders to make their
decisions. State statutes, through waiting periods and potential
hearings, have lengthened the time in which most tender offers
remain open. A.A. Sommer, Jr., has stated that this may in fact
be to the benefit of the shareholder as "experience, indeed, does
suggest that the longer an offer is open the likelier it is that another
bidder would enter the arena, resulting either in the original bidder
prevailing with a higher bid or another bidder topping it."'' 73
The SEC has stated in the introduction to the Proposed Rules
that it would compel disclosure on the "date of commencement of
the tender offer," as this term is defined in Proposed Rule 14d-6,17 1
173. Sommer, supra note 13, at 24, col. 4.
174. (a)(1) A tender offer for a class of equity securities referred to in section
14(d)(1) of the Act shall commence for the purposes of section 14(d) of the Act
and the rules promulgated thereunder on the date
(i) the tender offer is first published by the bidder pursuant to Rule
14d-4(a)(1) (§ 240.14d-4(a)(1));
(ii) the summary advertisement of the tender offer is first published
by the bidder pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(2) (§ 240.14d-4(a)(2));
(iii) the summary advertisement of the tender offer is first pub-
lished by the bidder pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a)(3) (§ 240.14d-4(a)(3));
(iv) definitive copies of a tender offer, in which the consideration
offered by the bidder consists of securities registered pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933, are first published, sent or given by the bidder
to security holders; or
(v) the tender offer is first published, sent or given to security
holders by the bidder, if
paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iv) of this section are not
applicable to such tender offer.
(2) With respect to a cash tender offer that is published, sent or given to security
holders by more than one method of dissemination pursuant to Rule 14d-4(a) (§
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instead of promulgating rules requiring advance filing and publica-
tion.75 The Commission believes that this "would facilitate the con-
fidentiality" of the tender offer and "would be consistent with the
legislative history of the Williams Act."' 78 Simultaneous filing and
commencement of the offer is designed to create, in the words of the
Commission, "an efficient filing system which will not unduly bur-
den bidders."' 7 On the other hand the public announcement re-
quirements of Proposed Rules 14d-6 and 14e-2(c) could have vir-
tually the same effect as advance filing.
In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, "" the Fifth Circuit
found that the state statute favored the target company by giving
it advance notice of the offer. It was, however, a combination of
protarget factors and not simply the provisions for advance notice
which led to this decision. The statute also had given the target the
ability to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting on a
hearing before the state attorney general,"'7 by regulating the activi-
ties of the offeror more strenuously than the activities of the target
company,8 0 and by empowering the board of directors of the target
company to exclude an offer from state regulation by approving the
offer. 18'
In its consideration of the Anti-Trust Improvement Act of
1976,11 Congress reaffirmed its view that regulatory provisions pro-
ducing more than minimal delay could upset neutrality. Congress-
man Rodino stated:
Lengthy delays will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat
the offer . . . . And the longer the waiting period, the more the
target's stock may be bid up in the market, making the offer more
costly - and less successful. Should this happen, it will mean
that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived
of the choice that cash tender offers give to them.""
240.14d-4(a)), the date of commencement of such tender offer will be determined
by the method which first complies with one of the sub-paragraphs of Rule 14d-
6(a)(1) (§ 240.14d-6(a)(1)).
SEC Release Nos. 33-6022, 34-15548, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,286A (Feb. 5,
1979). See 16 SEC DOCKET at 995 (Feb. 20, 1979).
175. 16 SEC DocKET at 984 n.38 (Feb. 20, 1979).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 986.
178. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
179. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (1975).
180. Compare id. §§ 30-1504, -1505 with § 30-1503(6).
181. Id. § 30-1501(5)(e).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1977).
183. 122 CONG. Rac. 10293 (1976).
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If delay does indeed favor the target, then both the Code draf-
ters and the SEC-like most of the state takeover laws-have in-
creased a target company's ability to defeat an offer by lengthy
delays. The Code has done so through the use of prospective filing
requirements, publication of notice and extended offer periods while
the SEC has done so through the use of extended offer periods,
advance public announcements and expanded withdrawal and pro-
ration rights.
The SEC and the drafters of the Code seem to agree that there
is a necessity for a longer offering period than the seven day mini-
mum offering period of the Williams Act, created by the seven day
withdrawal provisions of section 14(d)(5), and the ten days created
by section 14(d)(6) if the offer is for less than all the shares."' The
Code expands the offering period to at least thirty days; the ten days
required by section 606(d)(1) and the minimum of twenty days re-
quired by section 606(e). 85
At the time that the final draft of the Code was being drawn,
the SEC Proposed Rule 14e-2(a) which would have mandated that
an offer be kept open for a minimum of fifteen business days. "" The
Commission now proposes a minimum thirty business day offering
period and a minimum ten business day period following any in-
crease in price or dealer's soliciting fee.'87
184. No minimum offering period is imposed expressly by the Williams Act, but section
14(d)(5) permits the shareholder to withdraw tendered shares until seven days after the first
definitive copies of the offer are published. Section 14(d)(6) requires that all shares tendered
during the first 10 days of any tender offer for less than all the stock in an acquired company
be purchased pro rata. The New York Stock Exchange requires that cash tender ofiers remain
open for a minimum of 10 days and the American Stock Exchange requires a minimum of 14
days.
185. FED. SEC. CODE § 606(d)(1), (e). The Code also has the potential of extending the
offer for a period much longer than 30 days:
Every tender offer, unless withdrawn is effective (1) for at least twenty days
after it is made, (2) for at least fifteen days after any variation in its terms by
changing the consideration offered or the amount of securities covered, (3) for at
least seven days after any extension of the period of the tender offer, and (4)
during whatever longer period or periods the Commission prescribes by rule.
Id. § 606(e).
186. SEC Release No. 34-5371, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,659 (Aug. 2, 1976).
187. See 16 SEC DOCKET at 1004-1005 (Feb. 20, 1979).
The SEC recently adopted rule 13e-4 which prohibits fraudulent, deceptive and manipu-
lative acts and prescribes filing, disclosure and dissemination requirements with respect to
tender offers by issuers for their own securities. SEC Release Nos. 33-6108, 34-16112 & IC-
10842, [19791 517 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at E-1.
It is interesting to note that rule 13e-4(f) (1) requires that an issuer tender offer remain
open for at least fifteen business days from the date of commencement of the offer. In contrast
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While it might be desirable to lengthen the offering period of
the Williams Act, both the Code and SEC policy seem to go too far.
A.A. Sommer, Jr. believes that "in this instance, the Commission
may, contrary to its avowed intent, have tipped the balance in favor
of the target."' 85
Advance filing and duration of offer, therefore, are likely to
provide additional areas of conflict between the Code and the Com-
mission, ultimately requiring some form of compromise if these pro-
visions of the Code are to be adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION
On balance, the Code has succeeded in its major objective of
bringing order and rationality to a confusing mass of statutory and
administrative law. During the course of its development, the Code
has been responsive to changes in the law and to the watchful eyes
of its critics. Undoubtedly, further changes will be required before
the Code is adopted, and there will have to be a significant transi-
tion period for supportive rulemaking in order to complete the codi-
fication process. As illustrated by the limited offering and tender
offer provisions, not all questions are answered and not all problems
are solved. But from the perspective of the securities practitioner,
those questions that remain appear to be far more manageable than
the uncertainties and inconsistencies which presently exist.
to the minimum thirty day period of the proposed rules, the Commission believes that this
will allow a reasonable opportunity to make a informed investment decision with respect to
the tender offer.
188. Sommer, supra note 13, at 24, col. 4.
[Vol. 33:1551
